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Abstract
This paper examines how much structural change there was in the U.S.
economy in the last half of the 1990s. The results are consistent with the
hypothesis that there was only one major structural change, namely the huge
increase in stock prices relative to earnings. All other large changes can be
explained by this change. There is no obvious reason for the large increase
in stock prices relative to earnings. Increased productivity growth does not
appear to be an answer since the data show that there was only a modest
increase in long run productivity growth in the last half of the 1990s. Also,
earnings growth and the share of earnings in the economy were not unusually
large.
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Introduction

There was much talk in the United States in the last half of the 1990s about the
existence of a new economy or a “new age.” Was this talk just media hype or
were there in fact large structural changes in the 1990s? One change that seems
obvious is the huge increase in stock prices relative to earnings beginning in 1995.
This can be seen in Figure 1, where the price-earnings (PE) ratio for the S&P 500
∗ Cowles
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index is plotted.1 The increase in the PE ratio beginning in 1995 is quite large.
The mean of the PE ratio is 14.0 for the 1948.1–1994.4 period and 27.0 for the
1995.1–2002.3 period. This increase appears to be a major structural change, and
an important question is whether there were other such changes.
This paper uses the end-of-sample stability test developed in Andrews (2002)
to test 30 U.S. macroeconometric equations for structural change beginning in
1995. The equations are part of a multicountry econometric model (the MC model
discussed below). It will be seen (in Section 2) that the only major equation
for which the hypothesis of stability is rejected is the stock price equation. The
rejection for the stock price equation is, of course, not surprising given Figure 1.
It may be surprising, however, that there were no other major rejections, since a
number of macroeconomic variables have large changes beginning about 1995.
Four such variables are plotted in Figures 2–5. They are 1) the personal saving rate
(lower after 1995), 2) the U.S. current account as a fraction of GDP (lower after
1995), 3) the ratio of nonresidential fixed investment to output (higher after 1995),
and 4) the federal government budget surplus as a percent of GDP (higher after
1995). The results in this paper suggest that all four of these unusual changes are
caused by the stock market boom. The following is a brief outline of the results.
There are three U.S. consumption equations in the MC model, each of which
includes wealth as an explanatory variable, and, as just noted, the stability hypothesis is not rejected for any of these. In other words, conditional on wealth, the
behavior of consumption does not seem unusual. A wealth effect on consumption
also explains the low U.S. current account because some of any increased con1 The

data sources for all the variables discussed in this paper are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 1
S&P 500 Price-Earnings Ratio
1948:1-2002:3
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sumption is increased consumption of imports. Similarly, conditional on a low cost
of capital caused by the stock market boom, the behavior of investment does not
seem unusual according to the stability test of the investment equation. Finally, the
rise in the federal government budget surplus is explained by the robust economy
fueled by consumption and investment spending.
A counterfactual experiment is also performed in this paper using the MC
model. The experiment is one in which the stock market boom is eliminated. The
results show (in Section 3) that had there been no stock market boom, the behavior
of the four variables in Figures 2–5 would not have been unusual.
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Figure 2
NIPA Personal Saving Rate
1948:1-2002:3

Figure 3
Ratio of U.S. Current Account to GDP
1948:1-2002:3
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Figure 4
Investment-Output Ratio
1948:1-2002:3
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Figure 5
Ratio of Federal Government Surplus to GDP
1948:1-2002:3
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The story so far is thus quite simple: the only main structural change in the
last half of the 1990s was the stock market boom. All other unusual changes can
be explained by it. What is not simple, however, is finding a reason for the stock
market boom in the first place. The possibility that the degree of risk aversion of
the average investor fell in the last half of the 1990s is tested in Fair (2002) using
data on companies that have been in the S&P 500 index since 1957. The evidence
suggests that risk aversion has not fallen: there is no evidence that more risky
companies have had larger increases in their price-earnings ratios since 1995 than
less risky companies.
If earnings growth had been unusually high in the last half of the 1990s, this
might have led investors to expect unusually high growth in the future, which would
have driven up stock prices relative to current earnings. Figures 6 and 7, however,
show that there was nothing unusual about earnings in the last half of the 1990s.
Figure 6 plots the four-quarter growth rate of S&P 500 earnings, and Figure 7 plots
the ratio of NIPA after-tax profits to GDP.
Much of the new economy talk has been about productivity growth, and Section 4 examines productivity growth. It will be seen that using 1995 as the base year
to measure productivity growth, which is commonly done, is misleading because
1995 is a cyclically low productivity year. If 1992 is used instead, the growth rate
in the last half of the 1990s for the total economy less general government is only
slightly higher than earlier (from 1.49 percent to 1.81 percent per year). There is
thus nothing in the productivity data that would suggest a huge increase in stock
prices relative to earnings. The huge increase in PE ratios beginning in 1995 thus
remains a puzzle.
5

Figure 6
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of S&P 500 Earnings
1948:1-2002:3
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Figure 7
Ratio of NIPA Profits to GDP
1948:1-2002:3
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End-of-Sample Stability Tests

The 30 Equations
A stability hypothesis is tested in this section for 30 U.S. macroeconometric equations. The hypothesis is that the coefficients in an equation are the same both before
and after 1995:1. The equations are the stochastic equations in the U.S. part of the
MC model in Fair (1994). The latest estimates are on the website mentioned in
the introductory footnote. The equations are estimated by two-stage least squares
(2SLS) for the 1954:1–2002:3 period, a total of 195 observations. The estimation
accounts for possible serial correlation of the error terms. The first stage regressors
are the main predetermined variables in the model. There are about 40 first stage
regressors per estimated equation.2
The equations are specified under the assumption that households maximize
utility and firms maximize profits. The theory is used to guide the choice of explanatory variables. Lagged dependent variables are used to pick up expectational
2 The

MC model has been extensively tested, including tests for rational expectations, and it
appears to be a good approximation of the economy. These tests are in Fair (1994) and on the
website. There are 38 countries in the model for which stochastic equations are estimated: the
United States, Canada, Japan, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, South Africa, Korea, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Colombia, Jordan, Syria,
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, China, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
There are 31 stochastic equations for the United States and up to 15 each for the other countries. The
total number of stochastic equations is 365, and the total number of estimated coefficients is 1670.
In addition, there are 1111 estimated trade share equations. The total number of endogenous and
exogenous variables, not counting the trade shares, is about 2000. Trade share data were collected
for 59 countries, and so the trade share matrix is 59 × 59. The 21 other countries that fill out the
trade share matrix are Brazil, Turkey, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Bangladesh,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, Nigeria, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, the United
Arab Emirates, and an all other category. The estimation periods begin in 1954 for the United
States and as soon after 1960 as data permit for the other countries.
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and lagged adjustment effects. The following is only a brief discussion of the
equations. Detailed discussions are in Fair (1994) and on the website.
The explanatory variables in the four household expenditure equations (service,
nondurable, and durable consumption and housing investment) include after-tax
income, lagged wealth, and interest rates. They also include variables to pick up
age distribution effects. The consumer durables equation includes the lagged stock
of durable goods, and the housing investment equation includes the lagged stock of
housing. The explanatory variables in the four household labor supply equations
(labor force of males 25-54, females 25-54, all others 16+, and moonlighters)
include the real wage and a variable to pick up discouraged worker effects.
The nonresidential fixed investment equation has two cost of capital variables.
One is an estimate of the real AAA bond rate, and the other is a function of stock
price changes. It is through the second variable that stock prices affect investment.
This equation also includes output variables. The explanatory variables in the
inventory investment equation include sales and the lagged stock of inventories.
The explanatory variables in the demand for workers and demand for hours per
worker equations include output and the amount of excess labor on hand. There
are price and wage equations, where the price equation includes as explanatory
variables the wage rate, the price of imports, and the unemployment rate, and the
wage equation includes the price level and a productivity term.
There is a demand for money equation for the household sector, one for the
firm sector, and a demand for currency equation. The explanatory variables in each
of these equations include a transaction variable and an interest rate. There is a
stock price equation where the value of capital gains or losses on stocks held by
8

the household sector depends on the change in earnings and the change in the bond
rate.
There is an estimated interest rate rule of the Fed, where the explanatory variables include the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, and the lagged growth
of the money supply. The AAA bond rate and a mortgage rate are explained by
term structure equations, where the explanatory variables are current and lagged
values of the short term interest rate.
The demand for imports depends on a domestic activity variable and the ratio of
the domestic price level to the import price level. The remaining equations explain
overtime hours, dividends, interest payments of the firm sector, interest payments
of the federal government sector, inventory valuation adjustment, depreciation for
the firm sector, bank borrowing from the Fed, and unemployment benefits.
The Tests
The null hypothesis is that the coefficients in an equation are the same over the
entire 1954:1–2002:3 period. The alternative hypothesis is that the coefficients
are different before and after 1995:1. There are 195 total observations and 31
observations from 1995:1 on. If the potential break point were earlier in the
sample period, the methods in Andrews and Fair (1988) could be used to test the
hypothesis. These methods cover the 2SLS case. However, given that there are
only 31 observations after the potential break point, these methods cannot be used
because there are in general more first stage regressors than observations. In other
words, most equations cannot be estimated using only the 1995:1–2002:3 period,
which the methods require.
9

The end-of-sample stability test developed in Andrews (2002) can be used when
there are fewer observations after the potential break point than regressors. The
test used here is what Andrews calls the Pb test. In the present context this test is
as follows (the estimation method is 2SLS):
1. Estimate the equation to be tested over the whole period 1954:1–2002:3 (195
observations). Let d denote the sum of squared residuals from this regression
for the 1995:1–2002:3 period (31 observations).
2. Consider 134 different subsets of the basic 1954:1–1994:4 sample period.
For the first subset estimate the equation using observations 16–164, and use
these coefficient estimates to compute the sum of squared residuals for the
1–31 period. Let d1 denote this sum of squared residuals. For the second
subset estimate the equation using observations 1 and 17-164, and use these
coefficient estimates to compute the sum of squared residuals for the 2–32
period. Let d2 denote this sum of squared residuals. For the last (134th)
subset estimate the equation using observations 1–133 and 149–164, and
use these coefficient estimates to compute the sum of squared residuals for
the 134-164 period. Let d134 denote this sum of squared residuals. Then
sort di by size (i = 1, . . . , 134).
3. Observe where d falls within the distribution of di . If, say, d exceeds 95
percent of the di values and a 95 percent confidence level is being used, then
the hypothesis of stability is rejected. The p-value is simply the percent of
the di values that lie above d.
Note in step 2 that each of the 134 sample periods used to estimate the coefficients includes half (rounded up) of the observations for which the sum of squared
residuals is computed. This choice is ad hoc, but a fairly natural finite sample
adjustment. The adjustment works well in Andrews’ simulations.
For the results below two stability tests were performed per equation. The
first, as discussed above, uses the sample period 1954:1–2002:3, with the potential
break at 1995:1. The second uses the sample period 1954:1–2000:4, with again
10

the potential break at 1995:1. In other words, the second test does not include what
happened in 2001 and 2002.
The Results
The p-values for the 30 equations are presented in Table 1.3 A value of 1.000
means that d computed in step 1 is smaller than all of the di values computed in
step 2. A value of 0.000 means that d is larger than all of the di values. At a 95
percent confidence level, any p-value less than .05 is a rejection of the hypothesis
of stability.
The results show that using a 95 percent confidence level the hypothesis of
stability is rejected for only three equations. One is, not surprisingly, the equation
explaining capital gains or losses on stocks (equation 25). The explanatory variables in this equation include the change in earnings and the change in the bond
rate, and neither of these variables has values in the last half of the 1990s that
would predict a hugh increase in stock prices.
The other two rejected equations are not important equations in the model. One
(equation 26) is the demand for currency equation, which is not important because
of the use of the interest rate rule (equation 30). The other rejected equation
(equation 19) links the NIPA interest payments data of the firm sector to interest
3 Dummy

variables that take on a value of 1.0 during certain quarters and 0.0 otherwise appear
in a few of the 30 equations. For example, there are four dummy variables in the U.S. import
equation that are, respectively, 1.0 in 1969:1, 1969:2, 1971:4, and 1972:1 and 0.0 otherwise. These
are meant to pick up effects of two dock strikes. A dummy variable coefficient obviously cannot
be estimated for sample periods in which the dummy variable is always zero. This rules out the
use of the end-of-sample test if some of the sample periods that are used in the test have all zero
values for at least one dummy variable. To get around this problem when performing the test, all
dummy variable coefficients were taken to be fixed and equal to their estimates based on the entire
sample period.
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Table 1
Stability Test Results for the 30 Equations
Eq.

Dependent Variable

end 2002:3
p-value

end 2000:4
p-value

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Service consumption
Nondurable consumption
Durable consumption
Housing investment
Labor force, men 25-54
Labor force, women 25-54
Labor force, all others 16+
Moonlighters
Demand for money, h
Price level
Inventory investment
Nonresidential fixed investment
Workers
Hours per worker
Overtime hours
Wage rate
Demand for money, f
Dividends
Interest payments, f
Inventory valuation adjustment
Depreciation, f
Bank borrowing from the Fed
AAA bond rate
Mortgage rate
Capital gains or losses
Demand for currency
Imports
Unemployment benefits
Interest payments, g
Fed interest rate rule

1.000
0.858
0.119
0.716
0.567
0.866
0.440
1.000
0.112
1.000
0.881
0.261
0.649
0.739
0.976
0.507
0.440
0.500
0.000
0.134
0.500
0.806
0.396
0.410
0.000
0.000
0.933
0.955
0.784
0.903

1.000
0.957
0.504
0.844
0.482
0.929
0.766
1.000
0.106
0.972
0.943
0.206
0.610
0.624
1.000
0.390
0.369
0.447
0.000
0.149
0.475
0.667
0.362
0.340
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.993

• h = household sector, f = firm sector, g = federal government sector.
• First overall sample period: 1954:1–2002:3 except
1956:1–2002:3 for equation 15.
• Second overall sample period: 1954:1–2000:4 except
1956:1–2000:4 for equation 15.
• Break point tested: 1995:1.
• Estimation technique: 2SLS.
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rates and the flow of funds data on the net financial liabilities of the firm sector. This
link is not very tight, and the estimated equation does not have good properties,
including end-of-sample stability.
Overall, the results in Table 1 are strongly supportive of the view that there
were no major structural changes beginning in 1995:1 except for the stock market
boom. The equations for which the stability hypothesis was not rejected include
all the aggregate demand equations (consumption, investment, imports), the price
and wage equations, the labor supply and demand equations, and the estimated
interest rate rule of the Fed. The next section estimates what the economy would
have been like had there been no stock market boom.

3

Counterfactual: No Stock Market Boom

For the 10-year period prior to 1995 (1985:1–1994:4), the capital gain on household
financial assets (almost all of this gain is on corporate equities held by the household
sector) was $5.248 trillion, an average of $131.2 billion per quarter.4 The gain for
the next 5 years (1995:1–1999:4) was $13.560 trillion, an average of $678.0 billion
per quarter. During the next 11 quarters (2000:1–2002:3) the loss was $7.040
trillion, an average of −$640.0 billion per quarter. The total capital gain over the
entire 1995:1–2002:3 period was thus $6.520 trillion, an average of $210.3 billion
per quarter.
The counterfactual experiment assumes that the capital gain for each quarter
of the 1995:1–2002:3 period was $131.2 billion, which is the average for the prior
4 The

data cited in this section are from the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts.
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10-year period. This gives a total capital gain of $4.067 trillion, which is about
$2.5 trillion less than the actual value of $6.520 trillion. The timing, of course, is
quite different than what actually happened, since the experiment does not have
the huge boom up to 2000 and then the large correction after that.
The MC model is used for the experiment. The experiment can be duplicated
on the website mentioned in the introductory footnote. The experiment is for the
1995:1–2002:3 period. The estimated residuals are first added to all the stochastic
equations. This means that when the model is solved using the actual values of
all the exogenous variables, a perfect tracking solution is obtained. The actual
values are thus the base values. The capital gains equation 25, which explains CG,
the capital gains or losses on financial assets held by the household sector, is then
dropped from the model, and the value of CG in each quarter is taken to be $131.2
billion. The model is then solved. The difference between the solution value and
the actual value for each endogenous variable for each quarter is the effect of the
CG change. The solution values will be called values in the “no boom” case.
Figures 8–15 plot some of the results. Each figure presents the actual values of
the variable and the solution values. Figure 8 shows that the personal saving rate is
considerably higher in the no boom case. No longer are the values outside the range
of historical experience in 1999 and 2000. This is the wealth effect on consumption
at work. With no stock market boom, households are predicted to consume less.
Figure 9 shows that the current account deficit through 2000 is not nearly as bad
in the no boom case: imports are lower because of the lower consumption. Figure
10 shows that there is a much smaller rise in the investment-output ratio in the no
boom case. Investment is not as high because the cost of capital is not as low and
14

Figure 8
NIPA Personal Saving Rate
1995:1-2002:3
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Figure 9
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Figure 10
Investment-Output Ratio
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Figure 11
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Figure 12
Four-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP
1995:1-2002:3
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Figure 13
The Unemployment Rate
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Figure 14
Four-Quarter Percentage Change in PNF
1995:1-2002:3
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Figure 15
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate
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because output is lower. Figure 11 shows that the federal government budget is
not as good, which is due to the less robust economy.
Figure 12 plots the percentage change in real GDP, and Figure 13 plots the
unemployment rate. Both show, not surprisingly, that the real side of the economy
is worse in the no boom case, especially through 2000. In the fourth quarter of
1999, for example, the unemployment rate in the no boom case is 5.6 percent,
which compares to the actual value of 4.1 percent. Figure 14 plots the private
nonfarm deflator (PNF). It shows that the rate of inflation is lower in the no boom
case (because of the higher unemployment rate), although in neither case would
one consider inflation to be a problem.
Figure 15 plots the three-month Treasury bill rate, which is the rate determined
by the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed. The figure shows that the bill rate is
lower in the no boom case. The Fed is predicted to respond to the more sluggish
economy by lowering rates. In the fourth quarter of 1999, the bill rate is 3.2
percent in the no boom case, which compares to the actual value of 5.0 percent. It
is interesting to note that this amount of easing of the Fed is not enough to prevent
the unemployment rate from rising, as was seen in Figure 13. Note from Figure
12, however, that by the end of 2000 the growth rate is higher in the no boom case.
This is partly due to the lower interest rates in the no boom case.
It is thus clear from the figures in this section that according to the MC model
the U.S. economic boom in the last half of the 1990s was fueled by the wealth
effect and cost of capital effect from the stock market boom. Had it not been for
the stock market boom, the economy would have looked more or less normal.

17

As noted in the introduction, much of the new economy talk has been about
productivity growth. For the experiment in this section long run productivity
growth is exogenous: the MC model does not explain long run productivity growth.
This issue will now be addressed.

4 Aggregate Productivity
Figure 16a plots output per worker hour for the total economy less general government for 1948:1–2002:3. Also plotted in the figure is a peak-to-peak interpolation
line, with peaks in 1950:3, 1966:1, 1973:1, 1992:4, and 2002:3. The annual growth
rates between the peaks are 3.27, 2.72, 1.49, and 1.82 percent, respectively. Figure 16b is an enlarged version of Figure 16a for the period from 1985:1 on.5
An interesting feature of Figure 16a is the modest increase in the peak-to-peak
productivity growth rate after 1992:4: from 1.49 to 1.82 percent. This difference
of 0.33 percentage points is certainly not large enough to classify as a movement
into a new age.
It can be seen in Figure 16b why some were so optimistic about productivity
growth in the last half of the 1990s. Between 1995:3 and 2000:2 productivity grew
at an annual rate of 2.49 percent, which is a noticeable improvement from the 1.49
percent rate between 1973:1 and 1992:4. What this overlooks, however, is that
5 In the MC model potential productivity is taken to lie on the interpolation line, from which
a measure of firms’ holdings of excess labor is computed for each quarter. The amount of excess
labor on hand (lagged one quarter) is then an explanatory variable in the labor demand equations
(demand for workers and demand for hours per worker) of the firm sector. The amount of excess
labor on hand is estimated to have a negative effect on labor demand. Long run productivity is
exogenous in the model because the interpolation line does not change as a function of anything in
the model.
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Figure 16a
Log of Output per Worker Hour: 1948:1-2002:3
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Figure 16b
Log of Output per Worker Hour: 1985:1-2002:3
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productivity grew at an annual rate of only 0.27 percent between 1992:4 and 1995:3,
so 1995 is a low year to use as a base. Under the assumption that the interpolation
line measures cyclically adjusted productivity, the 2.49 percent growth rate between
1995:3 and 2000:2 is composed of 1.82 percent long run growth and 0.67 percent
cyclical growth.
Productivity data are also available for the nonfarm business sector, and it
is of interest to see if the above results are sensitive to the level of aggregation.
In 2001 real GDP (total output) less general government output accounted for
89.4 percent real GDP and nonfarm business output accounted for 83.8 percent.
(Nonfarm business output excludes output from farms, households, and nonprofit
institutions in addition to output from general government.) Figures 17a and 17b
are for the nonfarm business sector.
There is only a modest change in moving from Figures 16a and 16b to Figures
17a and 17b. The increase in long run productivity growth beginning in 1992:4 is
now 0.50 percentage points (from 1.43 percent to 1.93 percent) rather than 0.33
(from 1.49 percent to 1.82 percent). The actual growth rate from 1992:4 to 1995:3
is now 0.39 percent rather than 0.27 percent, and the actual growth rate from
1995:3 to 2000:2 is now 2.50 percent rather than 2.49 percent. Again, under the
assumption that the interpolation line measures cyclically adjusted productivity, the
2.50 percent growth rate between 1995:3 and 2000:2 is composed of 1.93 percent
long run growth and 0.57 percent cyclical growth for the nonfarm business sector.
Regarding other studies of productivity growth in the 1990s, Blinder andYellen
(2001) test for a break in productivity growth beginning in 1995:4, and they find a
significant break once their regression equation is estimated through 1998:3. From
20

Figure 17a
Log of Output per Worker Hour: 1948:1-2002:3
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Figure 17b
Log of Output per Worker Hour: 1985:1-2002:3
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Figures 17b and 18b this is not surprising, given the rapid productivity growth
between 1995:4 and 1998:3. Again, however, 1995:4 is a misleading base to use.
Oliner and Sichel (2000) compare productivity growth in 1990–1995 to that in
1996–1999 and do not adjust for cyclical growth. This is also true in Nordhaus
(2000), who compares productivity growth in 1990-1995 to that in 1996-1998.
Gordon (2000a, 2000b) argues that some of the actual productivity growth after
1995 is cyclical. He estimates in Gordon (2000b, p. 219) that of the actual 2.82
percent productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector between 1995:4 and
1999:4, 0.54 is cyclical and 2.28 is long run. This estimate of 0.54, which is backed
out of a regression, is remarkably close to the 0.57 figure estimated above for the
1995:3–2000:2 period using the interpolation line in Figure 17b. Gordon’s actual
number of 2.82 percent is larger than the actual number of 2.50 percent in Figure
17b. This difference is primarily due to the fact that Figure 17b uses revised data.
The data revisions that occurred after Gordon’s work had the effect of lowering
the estimates of productivity growth.
Gordon’s results and the results from Figure 17b are thus supportive of each
other. Although Gordon estimates long run productivity growth to be 2.28 percent,
Figure 17b suggests that this number is less than 2 percent based on the revised
data. The message of Figures 17b and 18b is thus that productivity growth has
increased in the last half of the 1990s, but only by about 0.4 to 0.5 percentage
points.

22

5

Conclusion

The results in this paper are consistent with the simple story that the only major
structural change in the last half of the 1990s was the huge increase in stock prices
relative to earnings. The only major U.S. macroeconometric equation in the MC
model for which the hypothesis of end-of-sample stability is rejected is the stock
price equation. The counterfactual experiment using the MC model in which the
stock market boom is turned off shows that were it not for the boom the behavior
of variables like the saving rate, the U.S. current account, the investment output
ratio, and the federal government budget would not have been historically unusual.
Also, the data on aggregate productivity do not show a large increase in trend
productivity growth in the last half of the 1990s: there is no evidence in the data
of a new age of productivity growth.
None of the results in this paper provide any hint as to why the stock market
began to boom in 1995. In fact, they deepen the puzzle, since there appear to be no
major structural changes in the economy (except the stock market) and there is no
evidence of a new age of productivity growth. In addition, Figures 6 and 7 show
no unusual behavior of earnings in the last half of the 1990s, and the results in Fair
(2002) suggest that risk aversion has not decreased. In short, there is no obvious
fundamental reason for the stock market boom.
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Appendix
The data sources are as follows.
• The S&P 500 data on stock prices and earnings were taken from the website,
www.spglobal.com/earnings.html, and from Standard and Poor’s Statistical
Service, December 1998. The price is the price at the end of the quarter, and
the value of earnings is the sum of earnings in the quarter just ended and in
the previous three quarters. Earnings are reported earnings (not operating
earnings) and are after tax. (Figures 1 and 6)
• NIPA nominal GDP: Table 1.1, line 1. (Figures 3, 5, 9, and 11)
• NIPA U.S. current account: nominal exports (Table 1.1, line 14) minus
nominal imports (Table 1.1, line 17). (Figures 3 and 9)
• NIPA real GDP: Table 1.2, line 1. (Figure 12)
• NIPA real nonresidential fixed investment: Table 1.2, line 8. (Figures 4 and
10)
• NIPA nonfarm business deflator (PNF): Table 1.7, line 3, minus Table 3.1,
line 4, all divided by Table 1.8, line 3. (Figure 14)
• NIPA total output less general government: Table 1.8, line 1, minus Table
1.8, line 10. (Figures 4, 10, and 16)
• NIPA nonfarm business output: Table 1.8, line 3. (Figure 17)
• NIPA after-tax profits: Table 1.14, line 24. (Figure 7)
• NIPA personal saving rate: Table 2.1, line 35. (Figures 2 and 8)
• NIPA federal government budget surplus: Table 3.2, line 28. (Figures 5 and
11)
• Three month Treasury bill rate: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. (Figure 15)
• Worker hours for the economy less general government, worker hours for
nonfarm business, the unemployment rate: Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Figures 13, 16, and 17)
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